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Summary  findings
Kim investigates whether the credit channel is a key  He finds convincing evidence of the importance of the
monetary transmission mechanism in the Republic of  credit channel in the aftermath of the crisis. Bank lending
Korea, especially after its recent financial crisis.  plays a significant independent  role in amplifying the real
To identify the existence of a distinctive credit channel  effects of the tightened  monetary policy implemented in
(especially the bank lending channel), he applies two  response to the crisis.
empirical tests to both aggregate financial data and  There is strong evidence to suggest a substantial excess
disaggregated bank balance sheet data.  demand for bank loans following the crisis. This excess
As a more definitive analysis of the role of the credit  demand was caused by a sharp decline in loan supply
channel, he estimates a disequilibrium model of the bank  largely attributable to pervasive and stringent bank
loan market, specifying separate loan demand and supply  capital regulation (a capital-induced bank credit crunch),
equations to characterize the credit crunch and identify  rather than by weak demand for loans.
its intensity in the wake of the crisis.
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Since the early 1997, there has been a gradual process of fragile credit market
conditions in Korea such as an exposure of the banking sector to  large non-performing
loans driven predominantly by a wave of major corporate bankruptcies.  As the financial
crisis unfolded in the early December of 1997, the Bank of Korea evidently maintained
the stance of monetary tightening according to the IMF  rescue package by allowing a
substantial rise  in interest rates.  The resulting severe liquidity  shortage in the money
markets and an observed  sharp fall  in bank lending primardily  due to  banks'  desperate
needs  to meet  BIS capital/asset ratio  were immediately  followed by  a massive  credit
squeeze.  Some skeptics argued that the sharp reduction  in bank  loans was essentially
associated  with  nothing  more  than  the  typical  weak  loan  demand  in  a  recession.
However, the sharp decline in bank lending has evoked claims by many observers of a
credit crunch in the banking sector and raised great concern about its implications for the
availability of credit to the private sector and the real economiic  activities. Actually, there
was a serious risk that financial distress in both banking and corporate sectors would lead
to a significant and prolonged economic decline in Korea.
This anecdotal evidence appears to lend strong credence to the possible existence
of a credit channel in the monetary transmission mechanism.  In particular, the episode
of severe monetary restriction and the alleged credit crunch in the banking sector in the
aftermath of the crisis, which deem rather unusual from a historical perspective, motivate
us to  identify  whether the  credit  channel played  a distinctilve role in  transmitting the
monetary/financial shocks to real economic activity. As we will  fill in some detail below,
the credit channel in monetary transmission, which is operative through the bank lending
channel, the balance sheet channel or both,  may be characterized  as having a role of
amplifying and propagating the direct  effects of monetary/financial shocks on interest
rates (a liquidity effect).  More importantly, it seems clear that the credit channel based
on much solid micro-foundation (i.e., credit market imperfections) provides a richer, and
more plausible, account of the inextricable link between financial and real sectors than
the traditional interest rate (cost of capital) channel.  In this sense, it is expected that the
credit channel will help us to  better understand the monetary  transmission mechanism
underlying the crisis.
The objective of this paper is to  investigate whether the credit channel is a key
monetary transmission mechanism in Korea, particularly following the recent financial
crisis.  We also attempt to identify the characteristics of the credit crunch and its intensity
in  the wake  of the  crisis  in  order to  more definitively  capture  the role  of the  credit
channel.
To this end, we first carry out two empirical tests for identifying the existence of a
distinctive lending channel in Korea.  These two tests  involve the so-called "narrative
approach", using a sequence of focal episodes of restrictive  monetary policy as a means
of identifying monetary shocks in the sense of Romer and R'omer (1990).  Another test
was used to explore what the lending channel has to say about the differential responses
of bank's  primary assets (bank loans and securities) to a contraction in monetary policy
between small and large bank groups, following Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 1997).
2Next,  a definitive test of the existence of the credit crunch is performed by fitting and
estimating separate demand and supply functions for bank loans in Korean commercial
loan market,  using  a disequilibrium  model  of loan market  advanced  by Maddala  and
Nelson (1974, 1984).
This paper finds  convincing evidence of the practical  importance of the credit
channel  (more specifically,  the bank  lending  channel),  in  the monetary  transmission,
particularly during  the financial -crisis.  In addition, the empirical  investigation of the
credit crunch using the disequilibrium model reveals a compelling evidence that in the
aftermath of the financial  crisis, there has been a substantial  excess  demand for bank
loans caused by a sharp loan supply decline mostly driven by a pervasive and stringent
bank capital regulation.  It is noteworthy that the pattern of the excess demand for loans
was reasonably consistent  with the survey  measure to  the extent  of the credit  market
tightness faced by small and medium-sized firms.
The next section describes the theoretical underpinnings of the credit channel in
the monetary transmission.  Section III gives empirical evidence on the existence of the
bank lending channel and the disequilibrium model evidence of the credit crunch. Section
IV presents conclusions.
II. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Credit Channel
The credit view contends that two channels of monetary transmission - the bank
lending  channel  and  balance  sheet  channel  - arise  mainly  due  to  informational
asymmetry existing between borrowers and lenders in financial markets.
The bank  lending channel centers on the premise that bank loans are of special
importance particularly for bank-dependent small firms in monetary policy transmission.'
This  special nature of bank loans is attributable to the more realistic presumption that
bank loans differ from publicly issued securities in a'meaningful  way (i.e., an imperfect
substitutability of the two assets).  In contrast, the pure money view of the transmission
mechanism  is  characterized  by  the  simple  two-asset  (money  and  publicly  issued
securities) feature where bank loans are conveniently lumped together with the securities.
The lending channel presumnes  that small and medium-sized firns,  facing informnational
frictions in financial markets, rely primarily on bank loans for external finance because it
is prohibitively expensive for these borrowers to issue securities in the open market.  To
assert the existence of a distinctive lending channel of monetary policy transmission, it is
important to  correctly  identify  whether  a  reduction  in  bank  lending  following  tight
monetary policy is largely the consequence of an inward shift in loan supply (i.e., the loan
supply effect), rather than just  an  inward shift  in loan demand  (i.e., the loan demand
effect).  This  identification issue boils down to  the following question: can the central
bank reduce the loan supply of banks merely by draining reserves?
see Bemanke  and Blinder  (1988),  Morgan  (1992),  Bemanke  (1993),  Kashyap  and Stein  (1994,1995).
3An insight into a distinctive feature  of the lending  channel may be  gained by
examining the real  effect of  a  sharp rise  in  open-market interest  rate  following tight
monetary policy.  The key point here is that the real effect of higher interest rates may be
amplified through  the lending  channel  beyond  what  would  be predicted  were  policy
transmitted solely through the traditional interest rate (cost of capital) channel.  As market
interest rates rise subsequent to monetary tightening, business investment falls not only
due to a higher cost of capital that forces most firms including even large ones to cut back
on their  demand for  investment (i.e., via the interest  rate  channel) but  also due  to  a
reduction of banks'  loan supply to mostly the small and medium-sized firms (i.e. via the
lending channel).  Thus, the lending channel would reinforce the dampening effect of
rising market interest rates on investment by generating a further decline in those small
firms'  spending  on investment, which  in turn  can aggravate the downturn of the real
economic activity.
Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995) argue that banking firms may be subject to the
same sort of capital market imperfections as their non-financial counterparts (i.e., small
and medium-sized firms).  According to their view, if a bank lending channel is effective,
the loan supply effects can be captured as follows.  A monetary contraction should cause
small banks to cut their loan supply by relatively more than large banks,  reflecting the
hypothesis that small banks are more likely to face higher costs in attracting non-deposit
sources of external finance such as CDs to offset a loss in reserves.
The balance  sheet channel  arises  because  rising  inlterest rates,  following tight
monetary policy, directly increase the interest expenses of the non-financial firms who
rely heavily on short-term debt to finance inventories and wcirking capital, reducing their
net cash flows and weakening their balance sheet positions.  Further, rising interest rates
are also associated with falling asset prices, which indirectly shrink the value of the firms'
collateral.  These effects lead to a reduction of the firms' net worth, thereby raising the
premium for external finance (a wedge between the cost of funds raised externally and
the opportunity cost of internal funds).  It is for the most part small and medium-sized
firms having relatively lower collateralizable net worth  (i.e., lower creditworthiness) than
large firms that are most likely to face a disproportionately larger premium for external
finance.  Hence, small and medium-sized firms that have relatively poor access to short-
term credit  markets respond  to the  deteriorated balance-sheet  positions  principally  by
drawing  down  inventories  and  by  cutting  investment  more  than  large  firms. 2 This
shrinkage in investment provides an additional source of amplifying and propagating the
initial decline in investment that would be predicted if the interest rate channel alone is
operative subsequent to tight monetary policy. This phenomenon is consistent with what
has been referred to as the "financial accelerator".'
2  Note that the credit  channel  is supportive  of the asymmetric  effect  oif^monetary  policy: the substantial
disadvantages  facing  small  and medium-sized  firms in financing  ancl  investment  behaviors  compared
to large ones arise  mainly  in tight-money  periods and in recessions.
3  See Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1993,  994), Bernanke  and Gertler  (1995), RIubbard  (1994),  Mishkin(1995),
Bemanke,  Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1998).
4It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  non-financial  firms'  net  worth  positions  are
potentially sensitive to a number of adverse shocks including a sharp increase in market
interest rates, such as an unanticipated exchange depreciation, a reduction in the rate of
growth rate in return to capital and debt deflation.
III. Empirical Evidence
As  we  have already  argued, in  order  to  capture the  existence of  a  distinctive
lending channel,  it is critical to resolve the identification problem, identification of the
loan  supply  effects.  Two  empirical  tests  focusing  on  adequately  dealing  with  the
identification issue are applied in order to explore whether the bank lending channel has a
distinctive role in amplifying the real effects of monetary tightening,  particularly during
the financial crisis in Korea.  These two tests involve the so-called "narrative approach",
using  a  sequence  of  focal  episodes  of  restrictive  monetary  policy  as  a  means  of
identifying monetary  shocks in the sense of Romer and Romer (1989,  1990).  Another
test is to examine what the lending channel has to say about the differential responses of
bank's  primary assets to a contraction in monetary policy between small and large bank
group, following Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 1997).
More importantly,  it seems also  very  informative to  examine whether a  credit
crunch has taken place in the afternath  of the financial crisis in December 1997 and, if
so, to directly measure its intensity.  This attempt may give us considerable insight into
the practical  importance  of the credit  crunch as  a principal  source of  propagating  an
economic decline.
1. Test for the Bank Lending Channel During the Financial Crisis:
a Narrative Approach
Empirical Methodology
First, we  need to identify  a sequence of focal  episodes of restrictive monetary
policy in which the monetary authority (the Bank of Korea) appeared to have deliberately
been willing to accept some output sacrifices.  Since there were no appropriate official
statements available which can provide useful information for selecting with  sufficient
precision the focal episodes of a monetary tightening, we instead relied on information
from the historical trends of major financial variables available, such as various monetary
aggregates and short-term interest rates,  including the major shifts in the policy stance of
the Bank of Korea  to monetary contraction. This approach is expected to help identify
reasonably well the dates when monetary policy has been tightened (i.e., the loan-supply
effects), compared to the allegedly questionable information on the tight monetary policy
stance  delivered  from  the  traditional  approach  using  the  growth  of  the  monetary
aggregates.
5Second, if monetary policy is indeed a relatively more important source of output
fluctuations in the chosen focal episodes and affects output not only through money but
also through bank lending, we would expect the effect of bank lending on output to be
strong enough after the focal episodes over some prolonged period.  If the bank lending
has played an important role in amplifying the real effects of tightened monetary policy,
the impact of bank lending on output might be larger than those of money in the focal
episodes. These differential effects can be identified using an econometric methodology
elaborated below.
Identification of the December 1997 Episode as a Measure of Tighter Monetary
Contraction.
We identified solely one focal episode of monetary contraction during the period
of 1  990s in which the Bank of Korea appeared to have deliberately been willing to accept
monetary tightening by both raising its intervention rate (RP rate) and reducing the base
money. The identified focal  episode of restrictive monetary  policy  involve December
1997.  We selected this focal episode in consideration of the distinctive shift in policy
stance of Bank of Korea and on the basis of information from the historical trends of all
relevant  financial variables available,  including the growth  rates of base money, total
reserves, Ml, MCT, and  bank loans; movements in short-term interest rates; and the gap
between the target  growth rates of M2 (and MCT) 4  and thieir actual rates.  It is worth
noting that December  1997 is tied together with the central bank's  obvious shift to the
restrictive monetary policy in response to the onset of financial crisis.
In  fact, the Bank  of Korea  has been under  sustained pressure to  shore up the
sharply depreciated Won against the US dollar as the currency crisis began in the early
July of 1997 in Thailand, and as the currency contagion spread to Korea.  As the financial
crisis unfolded in the early December of 1997, the Bank of Korea evidently maintained
the stance of monetary tightening  according to the IMF  rescue package by allowing a
substantial rise in interest rates and cutting back on base money.  The resulting severe
liquidity shortage in the money markets and a sharp fall in bank lending mainly due to
banks'  desperate needs to improve anemic capital/asset ratios were immediately followed
by a massive credit squeeze.
We also  verified  that  the movement  of the  major  relevant  financial variables
around the December  1997 episode identified on the basis of the obvious shift in policy
stance  of  the  Bank  of  Korea  in  response  to  the  financial  crisis  event  were  largely
consistent with the general effect of a monetary tightening.  As shown in Figure 2, there
was a sharp increase in both call rates (RCA) and RP rates (]RAP)  in December 1997 due
to the severe monetary tightening.  Note that with the gradual realization of market-based
pricing  of  government  bonds  and  Monetary  Stabilization  Bonds  (MSBs:  special
4  M2 = MI + quasi-money  (time and saving  deposits  and residents' foreign  currency  deposits  at deposit
money  market). MCT  is defined  as M2 + CDs  of banking  institutions  + Money-in-trust  of non-bank
financial  institutions  and has been  adopted  as an intermediate  target along with M2 since 1997. MCT
is supposed  to provide  a better  measure  of the overall  liquidity  of the financial  system.
6negotiable  obligations  of the Bank  of Korea) through  competitive bidding  from  1990
onwards, repurchase  agreements and  reverses  (RPs)  involving  government  bonds and
MSBs mostly with one-year maturity have been used as central bank's  key instruments
for carrying out open market operations.
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< Figure 2 >
Furthermore, it seems clear from Figure 3 that at about the end of December 1997
the Bank of Korea tried to absorb banks'  reserve to  a greater extent by selling sizable
amount of Monetary Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) to the deposit money banks as a way of
implementing tight monetary policy.
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< Figure 3 >
To gain a further insight into whether the chosen episode is likely to reflect the
central bank's  serious intention of pursuing  tighter monetary policy,  we estimated the
effects of the general tightening after the focal episode of restrictive monetary policy on
the base money, MI,  MCT and bank  loans.  All  series are examined from the period
covering January  1987 to  June  1998 on a monthly basis. We have excluded pre-1987
observations not only because the data on the amount of MCT are not available but also
7in light of this paper's  main focus on examining how important role the credit channel
has played and how significant and strong the real effect of credit crunch has been in the
wake of the recent financial crisis in Korea.  To this end, we first regress, from January
1987 up to the month just before the episode, the monthly change in the logarithm of the
base money on 16 own lags in a univariate forecast equation 1, the monthly change in the
logarithm of  Ml,  MCT and  bank loans on 16 own lags, the contemporaneous value and
16 lags and one lead of the change in the logarithm of the index of industrial production,
as shown respectively in equations 2 through 4.
A ln RBt =a  1 biA ln RBt - i  (1)
AInMlt=a  L_,=biAlnMt-i+Y,,__=-ciAInYt-l  (2)
A In MCTt = a  +  Z_biA In Mt-c+  ciA ln Yt -i  (3)
AlnLt=at_i=1biAlnMt-i+Zi  &._ 1 ciAlnYt-i  (4)
where  RB is base  money, Y is the  index of industrial  production,  and  L is  the total
amount of bank loans  for sixteen nation-wide banks and ten regional banks combined.
Note that the lag length of each univariate forecast equation was selected based on the
criteria suggested by Said and Dickey (1984)' and the Box-Pierce Q-statistics indicating
no evidence of residual auto-correlation in each estimated forecast equation at a 5 percent
level.  We then used the actual paths of money (base money, Ml,  MCT) and bank loans
up to the month before the focal episode (December 1997) and the estimated coefficients
from those equations to construct dynarnic forecasts of the paths of money and bank loans
over the next seven months.  We cumulated the forecasted changes to obtain forecasts for
the levels of money and bank loans, finding the resulting forecast errors. If the cumulative
forecasting  errors  (actual values  - cumulative  forecasts)  for  money  and  lending  are
negative soon after the shift to tight monetary policy, morLey  and bank lending may be
said to have fallen as a result of the restrictive monetary policy after the episode.
The plotting of the base money shown in Figure 4 indicates that the forecast errors
for the episodes are consistently negative, and their absolulte  values continue to increase
over the seven  month forecasting  period.  The analogous forecast  errors  for MI  and
MCT, as shown in Figure 5 and 6, also indicate patterns that are quite similar to those for
the base money but the departures of RB and Ml  from their forecasted paths are more
rapid than the movements in MCT.  Note in particular that the actual lending appears to
have fallen more immediately and to a greater extent from ilLs  forecasted path than did the
movement in the forecast errors for MCT.
5  They  suggest  that the lag length  on the augmented  AR polynomial  equation  should grow  with  the
sample  size according  to £ = Int{12(T  /100)''  4}  ,  where T is the sarnple size and  Int is the integer
function.  Although the maximum lag length this formula suggests is thirteen, we preferred to choose
a lag length of sixteen because the reduced-form model specification appears to be more adequate in
that the error term of each equation tumed out to be white noise with that lag length.
8In  summary,  our  findings  would  suggest  that  the  single  focal  episode  we
identified represented important monetary  shock, and potentially  that the bank lending
played a crucial role in the monetary transmission mechanism.
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Empirical  Results  on  the  Real  Effect  of  the  December  1997  Episode:  Interest
Rate  Channel  vs.  Bank  Lending  Channel
We  now  turn  to  the  question  of  whether  the  strengths  of  the  money/output  and
lending/output  relationships  are  different  in  response  to  the  December  1997  policy  shift
to  a  monetary  tightening  in  the  aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis.  This  question  may  be
addressed  by  regressing  industrial  production  (Y)  on  money  ( M:  Ml  and  MCT)  and  on
10bank lending  ( L )6 using the reduced-form  forecasting  equations  5 and 6, as shown  below,
and comparing  the estimated  coefficients,  bi and c;  , of each equation.
A  ln Yt = a +  i1 biA ln  Yt -i  0ci  ln Mt-i+  ,5Dti  (5)
A ln Yt  =  a +  XYŽ 1 biA  ln Yt -.  iEZ  +  ciA  ln Lt-E +  _=  0 iDti  (6)
where Y, L and Mare the same as in equations  2 to 4 and the monthly dummies (D)
for the restrictive monetary policy are included in each equation.  We first estimated
equations  5 and 6 without dummies  (D)  by OLS and then estimated  each equation  with
dummies (D)  by two-stage least squares, instrumenting  with the lagged values of the
right-hand-side  variables 7 and the current and lagged values of a dummy  that is equal to
one on the focal episode  on which we identify shift to restrictive  monetary  policy.  The
next step is to show the dynamic  responses of industrial  production (Y) to money (MI
and MCT)  or bank lending (L), implied  by the OLS and IV estimates  of the money/output
or lending/output  regressions.  s
We then need to compare  the OLS and the two-stage  least squares (IV) estimates
of equations 5 and 6 to examine the relative strength of the estimated relationships
between  money  (or bank lending) and output. Note that the OLS estimates  of equation  5
simply  summarize  the usual  money/output  relations,  whereas  the IV estimates  summarize
the relationship  between movements  in output and the average  deviation  of money  from
its usual behavior in the focal episodes.  Again, analogous comments apply to the
difference of the  OLS and IV estimates of the lending/output  relationship.  As just
discussed, if we allow for the possibility that monetary policy affects output not only
through  money  but also through  bank lending,  and if monetary  policy  is a relatively  more
important  source of output fluctuations  in the focal episode than other normal times, it
may be the case that the tightened  monetary  policy in the focal episode would cause the
IV estimates  to imply a weaker  impact of money on output than the OLS estimates. In
contrast, we may expect the IV estimates of the lending/output relationships to  be
stronger  than  the OLS  estimates.
6  This data refer to the total loans  (averages)  of domestic  deposit  money  banks comprising  domestic
commercial  banks  (sixteen  nationwide  commercial  banks,  ten local banks and fifteen-two  foreign
banks  in Korea)  and specialized  banks  such as the Industrial  Bank of Korea.
7  A set of instrument  variables  used  here include  constant,  lagged  values  (I through 18)  of the
measured  Y and M (or L). It turns out that  there were no substantial  differences  in the results  for
adding  other  instrumental  variables  such as deposits  and security  holding  of banks  which  presumably
do not belong  in each  equation  explicitly  but enter  only through  their influence  on the monetary
aggregates  or bank lending.
8  For example,  the response  of M to Y at period zero is co The period one response  amounts  to co +
(blc 0 + cl). The period  two response  is c 0 + (b,c, + c,) + b1(b1co  + c,) + b2CO  +  c2; and so on.
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Figure 8 through 10 presents the results of the OLS and IV estimates of equations
4  and  5.  Figure  10 shows that  the  IV estimates  of the  impact of  bank  lending  on
industrial production are much larger than the OLS estimates at all horizons.  However,
as shown in Figure  8 and 9, the responses of industrial production to  money (MI  and
MCT) using the IV estimates appear not to be distinctively  larger than those obtained
using the OLS estimates; the effects implied by the IV estimates are somewhat lower for
Ml  and not consistently larger for MCT than those implied by the OLS estimates at most
horizons.
These results would be supportive of the view that bank lending has played an
important independent role in  amplifying the real effects of tightened monetary policy
implied by the interest rate channel in the December  1997 focal episode of restrictive
monetary policy.
2. Test for the Bank Lending Channel Using Disaggregated Bank Data
Testable hypotheses
The  first  testable  hypothesis  underlying  this  approach  provides  the  following
prediction: if the bank lending channel is operating (i.e. when loan supply rather than loan
demand effects  is identified  as  being very  important),  both  lending  volume  and  the
securities holding of smaller banks are expected to decline more rapidly in response to a
contraction of monetary policy than do those of larger banks.  Note that this prediction
13will holds when loan demand schedules facing the small banks are sufficiently inelastic9
(Kashyap and Stein, 1994). A simple graphical analysis may be of great use for gaining a
better understanding of the intuitive case for the loan supply effect.
When loan supply effects are important
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< Figure 11>
where (D is based on the prediction that a given contraction in reserves (deposits) in the
wake of a contraction in monetary policy can cause lending to fall more for small banks
than for large banks.  Intuitively, if the loan demand schedule facing a given small bank is
sufficiently inelastic as shown in the Figure 11, there will be a sharp increase in the small
bank's  loan rate relative to the return on security holding (i.e. an increase in the bank's
loan-security spread) compared with the large bank.  This movements in loan rate might
be inferred by looking at movement in securities.  If there were a sharp increase in the
small bank's loan-security spread, it might be possible to have a situation where the small
bank favors loans in its portfolio relative to  securities, and thus be more willing to  cut
securities to maintain lending volume.  Accordingly, this intuitive case implies that small
banks are expected to cut both lending volume and the securities holding by more than
large banks after a contraction in monetary policy, just in line with the testable prediction
mentioned above.  Furthermore, it may not be hard to infer what would happen if the loan
demand effects  are at work on the basis  of the  Figure  11 (although  not  shown here,
suppose that the loan demand schedule, LAD, instead of loan supply shifts in to the left).
In this case, the loan demand schedule facing both the small and large banks will shift in
to the left.  But if we suppose that the loan demand facing the small banks will shift in by
9  It appears  most likely  that this requirement  is satisfied  in practice  in Korea  in the sense  that small
banks  typically  lend  to smaller,  more  recession-sensitive  (and  more bank-dependent)  customers. This
also implies  that small-bank  loan demand  may be more pro-cyclical.
14more than that of large bank, there will be a sharp increase in the loan-security spread for
the small banks compared with large bank, leading them to favor securities in its portfolio
relative to loans. The movements in securities holding are apparently in contrast with the
prediction that may be valid when the loan supply effects are operating.
Another  testable  hypothesis  just  in  line  with  the  first  one  is  to  exploit  the
implication that the sensitivity of the lending volume to monetary tightening is greater for
banks facing tighter liquidity constraints in raising uninsured external finance and, if this
is the  case, the sensitivity  should  be  more pronounced for  small  banks  with  weaker
internal liquidity positions  (Kashyap and Stein, 1997).  But this hypothesis is not  also
completely free from some potential counterweight argument: if small banks face tighter
liquidity constraints than large banks, it is expected that they would hold larger buffer
stocks of liquid assets such as securities and short-term inter-bank market funds mainly to
insulate  their  lending  behavior  from  the  impact  of  unexpected  severe  monetary
tightening.  This means small banks should not be necessarily more liquidity constrained
than large banks all the time.  Nonetheless, it may be quite possible to  occur that the
buffer stock of the typical small banks will not be sufficient enough to be shielded from
the  very  severe  monetary  policy  tightening  and  will  be  more  subject  to  liquidity
constraints in credit market than the large banks.
Econometric Specification
To identify  whether the  loan supply effects  are really  important (i.e., whether
bank lending channel has a distinctive role in monetary transmission mechanism), it may
be worthwhile to test the cross-sectional implications of the prediction empirically.  To
this end, the test procedure should be of the following sort: we first need to divide banks
on the basis of their total assets into small and large categories that would also potentially
reflect differential in their costs of raising non-deposit external funds.  The six largest
commercial banks" 0 were classified as banks in the large category and ten regional banks"
as banks in the small category.  The next step is to  compare the responses of primary
assets (bank loans,  securities) of each bank group to a monetary contraction  using the
impulse responses in the standard vector autoregression (VAR).
In our case, the VAR approach was applied to monthly Korean data from January
1993 to May 1998 ( 65 observations) because of the paucity of relevant data.  The short-
tern  RP rate over which the Bank of Korea has direct leverage in the short-term may be a
10  The six largest commercial  banks  include  Cho Hung Bank (39,551  billion  Won),  Commercial  Bank
of Korea  (32,498  billion  Won),  Korea  First Bank  (31,771  billion  Won),  Hanil Bank (34,470  billion
Won), Bank of Seoul (29,655  billion  Won) and Korea  Exchange  Bank (38,594  billion  Won). The
amount  in parenthesis  indicates  the total assets  of relevant  bank as of the end of 1997.
Ten regional  banks include  Daegu  Bank (10,713  billion  Won),  Pusan Bank (10,168  billion  Won),
Chung  Chong  Bank (4,909),  Kwangju  Bank (6,182  billion  Won),  Bank of Cheju  (1,475 billion  Won),
Kyungki  Bank  (8,258 billion  Won),  Jeonbuk  Bank (2,532  billion  Won), Kangwon  Bank (3,435
billion  Won),  Kyongnam  Bank (7,034  billion  Won), Chungbuk  bank (2,970  billion  Won). The
amount  in parenthesis  indicates  the total  assets  of relevant bank as of the end of 1997.
15good  indicator of the  stance of  monetary  policy.  The  overnight rate,  however,  was
instead chosen to proxy for changes in the stance of monetary policy (a monetary policy
indicator) because sufficient time series of the RP rate were not available and the recent
movements in the call rate have been very much similar to  those in the RP rate." 2 Of
particular relevance  for our  analysis is to  exploit the  December  1997 policy  episode
which appears to adequately capture apparently severe contractionary shift in monetary
policy.  This  exogenous  episode  of  tighter  policy  would  provide  more  insightful
information about whether the bank lending channel operating mainly due to the presence
of  credit  market  imperfections  in  the  form  of  borrowing  restrictions  has  played  an
important role in propagating the real effect of the monetary policy shock not captured by
the traditional interest rate channel.  Both consumer price index (CPI)  and the industrial
production  index  (y  )  were  selected to  control  for  macro  conditions.  One  class  of
primary assets (bank loans and security holdings) of each bank group was considered in
the VAR analysis.  Data used were logarithms of the nominal level data of all variables
considered except the call rate.
For estimation purpose, the following standard finite vector autoregressive (VAR)
representation is considered:
Axt = a + EL  = 1 Ai Xt  - i +  ut,  E(utus) =  Q,  if t￿s  (7)
0,  otherwise
where A,is  a  square  coefficient  matrix;  utdenotes  the  vector  of  mean-zero,  serially
uncorrelated variables, and its  contemporaneous variance matrix,  Q,  is assumed to  be
positive  definite symmetric;  a  is a 4xl  column vector of parameters;  the vector  Xit
include three observable random time series variables under consideration, i.e., the  index
of industrial production (yj,,  consumer price index (Cpi,,),  lending volume (L,,)  (or
securities holdings (S,,))  and one of the call rate and the December 1997 policy episode
as a monetary policy indicator ( M, ).
We estimated the vector autoregressive representation (7) in the first difference to
reflect the preliminary  unit root test  results indicating the  time  series  variables being
considered are integrated of order one.  A lag length of three was selected and the Box-
Pierce Q-statistics at that length were consistent with the evidence that the error term of
each reduced-form equation is white noise within at least 10 percent level.  Furthermore,
it seems reasonable to focus on the VAR analysis containing only four variables of our
particular  interest in  light of the practical  consideration such as degree of freedom as
much as the potential cost of misspecification involved in selecting further lag length and
variables.' 3 So this  rather parsimonious  VAR  specification  seems  quite  adequate.  A
12  Note that  the contemporaneous  correlation  of these  two series(  RP  rate and call rate) during  the
period  of January 1996  through May 1998  turns out to be 0.99.
13  Estimating  the coefficient  on 4 lags of four variables  in the VAR specification  by adding  another
variable  with  this short sample  would  pose a problem  of exhausting  all degree  of freedom.
16temporal ordering of variables is considered based upon the following rationale; the call
rate appears first on the presumption that exogenous policy influence such as the central
bank's intervention through conducting open market operations has a direct impact on the
call rate.  Lending volume (L,,)  or securities holding ( S)  of each bank group is placed
second prior  to  the industrial production  index and  consumer price  index placed  last,
primarily  because  bank  portfolio  behavior  is  unlikely  to  be  appreciably  affected by
contemporaneous  macro  conditions.  Note  that  lending  volume  (L 11)  in  the  above
equations should be replaced by securities holding (S,, ) for each group to compare their
behaviors of securities holding in response to one standard-deviation shock to a monetary
tightening.
Empirical Results
Figure  12  and  13  provide  a  graphical  illustration,  plotting  the  cumulative
responses of the log of loan volumes and securities holding for banks in each group (large
and small banks) to a one-standard-deviation increase in the overnight rate (an indicator
of monetary policy) over a period of 24 months.14 If there is a much greater dampening
effect on the lending volume and the securities holding of small banks than those of the
large banks  after  a  positive  innovation  in  the  call  rate, the  results  would  be  largely
decisive in favor of the prediction of the bank lending channel  in the sense of Kashyap
and Stein (1995, 1997).











< Figure 12 >
14  It is worth  emphasizing  that  the  effect  of contemporaneous  innovation  on the  long-term  forecast  of
economic  variables  differs  markedly  from  either  VARs  in levels  or in first  differences.  For  the  VARs
in first  difference,  a contemporaneous  shock  to the  series  has a permanent  effect  on the  long-term
forecast  of the  series,  while  any shock  in period  t has only  a temporary  effect  for  the  VAR  in levels.
17The cumulative impulse responses shown in Figure  12 indicate that the lending
volume  of  small  banks  shrinks more  about  6  months  after  a  one-standard-deviation
increase (say, a one percent increase) in the call rate than the large banks'  lending.  Small
banks appear a little  sluggish in cutting down on their lending volume compared with
large banks during six months after the call rate shock, leading up to a decline in lending
volume of about 0.55 percent at six months out after a one percent increase in the call
rate.  Meanwhile,  large banks'  lending volume reveals  relatively  large  low-frequency
movements for a period of the first six months before beginning to drop by about 0.35
percent at six months after the call rate shock.  The difference in their responses appears
not  to  be  substantial; at six months  after the shock,  small  banks'  lending  volume is
declining merely by about 0.20 percent more relative to large banks' lending.
The  evidence  in  Figure  13, tracing  out  the  cumulative  impulse  responses of
securities holdings  for large and small banks to a one percent increase  in the call rate,
suggests that  small banks'  securities holdings  are indeed more  sensitive  to  monetary
policy  than  large  banks'  securities  holdings.  Small banks  appear  to  downsize  their
securities build up about four months  after a monetary tightening (as proxied by a one
percent increase in the call rate) probably to maintain lending volume, but with a shorter
lag than the patterns observed for lending volume.  Namely, after rising initially to some
extent, the growth rate of small banks'  securities  holdings drops  sharply  starting four
months  after the shock up to  almost zero percent  from about  1.5 percent  level before
leveling off at  0.2 percent or less after ten months.  In contrast, large banks'  securities
holdings tend to be essentially back to the initial growth trend at about ten months after
increasing sharply during the first several months.
It is  important to  note from  Figure  13 that  small banks'  securities  holding in
particular  continues  to  grow  rather  than  decrease  following  a  monetary  contraction,
although its growth rate tends to be lowered substantially after about four months.  This
evidence,  however,  would  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  above-mentioned  theoretical
prediction if we take into consideration the widely-helcl implication of credit rationing
that commercial loan rates are "sticky"  in that they are very slow to increase with open
market rates and credit market tightness following a monetary tightening.
One plausible explanation for the result may be as follows: small banks will have
to curtail loans mostly to their small bank-dependent, collateral-poor customers allegedly
perceived  to  be  less  sensitive  to  changes  in  loan  raLtes subsequent  to  a  monetary
contraction while engaging in the so-called "flight-to-quality" in lending." 5 However, if
the resulting loan rates are very slow to  increase, so that the loan rates relative to the
yields of securities are not sufficiently high, it is certainly conceivable that small banks
would not be willing to cut their securities holdings  significantly and instead try to hold
them as a cushion against the probability of facing potential illiquidity.
In  addition,  some  structural  feature  of  the  open  market  operations  in  Korea
presumably sheds light on the reason for the evidence shown in Figure  13; that is, when
15  It may be defined  as an increase  in the share of bank credits flowing  to borrowers  with low  agency
costs,  such as large firms, see Gilchrist  and Gertler  (1994).
18the Bank of Korea intends to shift to the restrictive monetary policy, it usually absorb
bank reserves by resorting to the (outright) sales of RPs with the banks involving mainly
Monetary Stabilization Bonds and government bonds.  But up until recently, open market
operations have been undertaken primarily with a view to absorbing short-term liquidity
supplied through the automatic rediscount facility necessitated by policy-based loans and
by foreign sector when the current account ran a substantial surplus.  This kind of quasi
open  market  operations  have  frequently  restricted  banks'  autonomous  portfolio
management and led banks to hold some unwanted proportion of those securities.'6
The Cumulative Response of Large and Small Bank Securities Growth to a
Call Rate Shock
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< Figure 13  >
On balance, the results in Figure 12 and 13 would seem to provide some positive
evidence in  favor of the theoretical prediction that both lending volume and securities
holdings of small banks tend to be more sensitive to a monetary contraction than by large
banks if the loan  supply effects become more pronounced for the small banks  facing
typically inelastic loan demand schedules and higher costs (tighter liquidity constraints)
in attracting non-deposit sources of external finance such as CDs.
We also reran all the equations corresponding to  the above VAR  specification
replacing the December  1997 episode as an alternative indicator of monetary policy for
the call rate to ensure the robustness of our results.  If the call rate used as our measure of
the monetary shock adequately proxies for the change in the stance of monetary policy,
then one should expect the cumulative impulse responses estimated with the alternative
VAR specification including the December 1997 episode as a measure of the apparently
severe monetary contraction to give some results similar to those in Figure 12 and 13.
16  In accordance  with  the Article  22 of the General  Banking  Act in Korea,  a banking  institution's
investment  in stocks  or debentures  and other  securities  with  maturity  exceeding  three years should  not
exceed  one hundred  per cent of its equity  capital. However,  note  that this stipulation  is not applied  to
government  bonds and  the Monetary  Stabilization  Bonds  of the Bank of Korea.
19As  it turns  out  in Figure  14 and  15, the cumulative  response patterns  of both
lending  volume  and  securities  holdings  in  the  wake  of  the  financial  crisis  shock
(December 1997) appear virtually identical to those in Figure  12 and 13.  A noteworthy
difference is that the lending volumes of both  large and small bank groups were more
sensitive to the crisis shock than they were to the call rate shock; the lending volumes for
banks in small group drops slowly up to about 1.0 or more percent at six months after the
financial crisis shock, which is more than twice the size s:hown  in Figure  12.  The same
pattern  also holds for the response  of lending volume  for large banks.  However, the
cumulative responses of securities holdings for banks in each group to the financial crisis
shock appear essentially identical to those in Figure 13.
The Cumulative  Response  of Large and  Small  Bank L,oan  Growth  to a












< Figure 14 >
The Cumulative  Response  of Large  and Small  Bank  Securities  Growth  to a
Financial  Crisis  Shock
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20Interestingly, these results  could conceivably be  interpreted as real evidence to
support  the  widely-held  view  that  there  occurred  a  substantial  credit  crunch  in  the
banking sector in the wake of the recent financial crisis.
3.  Disequilibrium Model Evidence of a Credit Crunch in the
Aftermath of the Financial Crisis
Why Does a Credit Crunch Matter ?
A credit crunch, defined as an unusual sharp decline in the supply of bank loans
usually perceived as quite possible to occur even with prevailing loan rates and quality of
borrowers," 7 is widely recognized as having substantial real effects by severely restricting
borrowers'  (mostly  bank-dependent,  poorly  capitalized  small  firms)  ability  to  obtain
credits and thereby causing a significant reduction in their spending on investment.  In
this respect, we may interpret a credit crunch as a negative IS-curve  shock, which can
have a dampening effect on the real economy as IS curve shifts downward substantially
even without  a monetary policy-induced leftward shift in LM curve (i.e., even when the
traditional  interest  rate  channel is  not  operative)  in the  context  of  the Bernanke  and
Blinder model  (1988).  If the credit  crunch, however,  is accompanied  by a  monetary
tightening immediately followed by a rise in market interest rates, then it would provide
the  important  source  of  propagating  the  economic  decline  beyond  what  would  be
predicted by the interest rate channel.8 So it seems  clear that  an attempt to  identify
whether there was indeed a credit crunch in the banking sector in the aftermath of the
financial crisis is key to better understanding  how much a  credit channel has played a
distinctive role in exacerbating the overall economic conditions as well as the real sector
in Korea.
This chapter aims at identifying whether a credit crunch has actually taken place
in the wake of the financial crisis and, if so, directly measuring its magnitude by fitting
and  estimating  separate  demand  and  supply  functions  for  bank  loans  in  Korean
commercial loan market.
17  See Bernanke  and Lown (1991),  among  others.
18  Bemanke  and Blinder  (1988)  present  a simple model  in which  the traditional  IS curve is modified  as
the so-called  CC curve ("commodities  and credit"  curve)  capturing  the role of credit (bank  loans)  in
the monetary  transmission  such that y = Y(  i, p) and  p = Of(  i, y, R), where i is the interest  rate on
bonds, R is bank reserves, y and p  refer  to GNP and  the interest  rate on loans respectively.  Note
that  the CC curve is shifted  by monetary  policy  ( R) and credit  market  ( p)  shocks. For example,  if a
monetary  tightening  (a decrease  in  R) is accompanied  by a credit crunch  ( a higher p),  the CC curve
(a variant  of IS curve) as well as the LM curve would  shift  inward, leading  to a substantial  decline  in
aggregate  demand. In that  case, it is expected  that these  shocks  would  reinforce  a contractionary
impact  on the CC curve and thereby  causing  a larger inward  shift  of the CC curve.
21Specification  of a Model of Loan Market in Disequilibrium
As  an  equilibrium  credit  rationing  in the  sense  of  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)
predicts, in equilibrium a loan market is characterized by a disequilibrium status. Loan
rates  are not  presumed  to  adjust  in  each  period  to  clear  the  market  (i.e.,  loan  rate
stickiness) and thereby the "short side" of the market prevails, in contrast to the usual
equilibrium setup. One problem with the market model in disequilibrium is that we have
to obtain estimators for the parameters in the loan supply and demand functions only with
one  observed  quantity  of transactions  in  loan market  in  the absence  of  any  a  priori
information  concerning  the  loan  rate  adjustment  process,  and  concerning  which
observations are on the demand function and which are on the supply function.  To avoid
this  problem,  we  employ  the  assumption  of  the  "short  side"  principle  in  which  the
observed quantity is constrained to be the smaller of the amount demanded and supplied,
which are not directly observed.  It seems important to note that such a disequilibrium
state can prevail  even in  an unregulated and competitive  loan market,  and reflect  the
actual loan market conditions reasonably well.
We here examine the characteristics of Korean cormmercial  loan market condition
using a disequilibrium model of loan market specifying separate loan demand and supply
equations along the lines of the models advanced by Laffont and Garcia (1977), Sealey
(1979), King (1986) and Pazarbasiouglu (1997). We estimate the parameters of the model
using the likelihood function and the maximum likelihood methods proposed by Maddala
and Nelson (1974, 1984) over the sample period of January 1993 through May 1998.
D
a=  o + a,L  + a 2(RL-  RCB),  + a 3IP, 1 (8)
Li = 60+6i1L, ,+  f/2  RL,+ /3 (RL-RCD),  + J4  DEP, +5  1P,1+  6 DMY,  (9)
Lt=min(Ls,L  D)  (10)
where  L  denotes real bank loans, i.e., total bank loans by the sixteen commercial banks
and ten regional banks are all deflated by the CPI, and  RL  refers to the weighted average
of loan rates applied by those banks;  RCB  denotes the yield of corporate bonds with a
three-year maturity;  RCD  indicates the interest rate on CDs; IP  and DEP  are the index
of industrial production for all items and real bank deposits (demand deposits plus time
and saving deposits deflated by the CPI), respectively.  DMY,  a dummy variable for the
financial crisis  in December  1997, is introduced to  capture any structural changes that
may have occurred in the commercial loan market in the aftermath of the crisis and takes
on  the  value  of  unity  following  December  1997  and  zero  elsewhere.  The  variables
included in the equations are all logged except the interest rates.
22The determinants of the real loan demand and supply functions in equations (8)
and (9) are chosen based on the following rationale; a lagged dependent variable (L,- l) is
allowed to  enter  the real  loan  demand  equation  (8) to  avoid  a  potential  problem  of
endogeneity between  dependent  and  explanatory  variables,  and  in  part  to  take  into
account  the  issue  of  stationarity  of  the  variables  under  consideration.19  A  price
differential between the loan rate and the yield of corporate bonds measuring the cost of
obtaining alternative important source of  external financing  for firms,  (RL-RCB),  is
used to capture the sensitivity of financing policy and to avoid the problem of high co-
linearity between these two variables in the sense of Laffont and Garcia (1977).  But the
weighted average of loan rate is excluded from the loan demand components because it is
not found to be statistically significant and its effect on the real bank loans turns out to be
negligible when estimated along with the rate differential. A lagged index of industrial
production (Ip,_,)  is used to approximate the firm's  expectations about future economic
activity.
A  lagged  dependent  variable  (L,-I)  is  allowed  to  enter  the real  loan  supply
equation (9) for the same reason as in the real loan demand function.  Both the weighted
average of loan rates (RL)  approximating the profitability  of bank's  lending activities
and the price differential between the loan rate and the rate on CDs representing a typical
non-deposit source of external financing for banks, (RL-RRCD),  are included.  Real
bank deposits (DEP)  is used as a measure of the most important resources available to
the bank.  A  lagged  index of industrial  production  (Ip,_,)  is  also  used in  the supply
equation to  reflect the  bank's  expectations  about the  overall  economic  activity.  The
dummy variable (DMY)  is included only in the loan supply equation and dropped from
the loan demand components because it is not  found to be  significant in the estimated
loan demand equation.
Empirical Results
The results are shown in Table  1.  They indicate that all coefficients of both the
loan demand and supply functions have the expected signs.  Significant residual variances
( a  ) in both equations imply that the model is reasonably well specified.  In the loan
demand equation, the interest differential  (RL-RCB)  has  the expected negative  sign
although its effect on the loan demand is rather small.  Industrial production does appear
to have a significant explanatory power in the loan demand equation.
19  Univariate unit root test indicates that the real bank loans, real bank deposits and the index of
industrial production are all well described as difference-stationary processes.
23< Table 1 >
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Loan Demand and Supply Functions
Variable  Loan  Demand  Function  Loan Supply  Function
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Notes  all series  are non-seasonally  adjusted  monthly  data  and cover  the period  of January
1993  to May 1998  (65 observations).  The data  used in this study,  with  the exception  of the
interest  rates, are available  in various  issues  of the Monthly Bulletin, The Bank  of Korea.
The weighted  average  of loan rate  and the interest  rates on CDs are from an unpublished
source  available  from  the Bank  of Korea. Asymptotic  t-statistics  arc provided  in parentheses.
In the  loan supply  equation,  both  the  loan rate  (RL)  and  interest  differential
(RL-RCD)  are significant  and have the  expected signs,  suggesting  that the cost  of
obtaining non-deposit source of external financing (CDs) as well as the loan rate appears
important in determining lending decisions. 20 The volume of real bank deposits (DEP)
has a highly significant positive coefficient.  This result confirms that lending decisions
are heavily dependent  on bank  deposits.  But the fact th,at the coefficient of industrial
production is insignificant may imply that industrial production is not taken into account
in lending in an important way.  Interestingly, the dummy variable for the financial crisis
20  While  I included  the market  capitalization  of the equities  listed  in Korea stock  market  in the loan
supply equation  to capture  a potential  effect of firm's equity  capital position  on lending  decisions,  it
turned  out that its coefficient  was statistically  insignificant  and didn't have  an expected  sign. So we
excluded  it from the supply equation.
24is found to have a significant negative sign.  This result appears to be in supportive of the
widely-held view that faced with the difficulty in attracting new loans from abroad and
rolling over their obligations along with desperate needs to improve their anemic capital/
asset  ratios in  the aftermath of the financial  crisis,  commercial banks  have unusually
engaged in a massive credit squeeze.
Given the estimates presented in Table 1, it is also possible to directly measure the
magnitude of excess demand for loans, the primary interest of this analysis, by fitting the
estimated loan demand and supply equations.  Figure 16 plots the fitted loan demand and
supply equations, and Figure 17 shows estimated excess demand for loans.
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< Figure 16 >
The results reveal that the loan market is characterized by a state of predominantly excess
demand for loans,  although with intermittent  periods  of excess supply.  Of the 65
months  in  the  sample,  only  15 months  exhibit  excess  supply  while  50  months  are
associated with  excess demand.  More  importantly, there  has occurred a marked large
excess demand caused by a sharp decline in loan supply ( i.e., by the credit crunch), right
after the financial crisis  in December  1997.  This evidence  suggests that  in the crisis
period after December 1997, the bank loans are essentially supply determined.
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< Figure 17  >
A comparison  of the  excess  demand  for  loans  with  the  survey results  of  the
external financing conditions facing small and medium-sized firns  in manufacturing in
Figure 18 shows that the trend of the excess demand seems reasonably consistent with the
extent of the credit market tightness.  The survey has been undertaken every month since
January  1994 by the Industrial  Bank of Korea  with a view  to  examining the external
financing conditions of small and medium-sized firms operating in manufacturing. The
number on the left scale in Figure  18 represents the percent of all the respondents who
identified greater difficulties in getting access to external financing including bank loans
relative to the immediately previous month.  While there is one appreciable caveat on the
similarities between those two trends during the excess supply period of the first half of
1995, the pattern of the excess demand during other periods is very similar to that of the
survey measure.
In particular, it is noteworthy that the ratio of the respondents reporting greater
difficulties  in  getting  access  to  credits  considerably  increased  (almost  three  times
compared to  other  periods)  during the  crisis.  This  result is  broadly in  line  with the
occurrence of the substantial excess demand for bank loans owing to the credit crunch
during the crisis period starting November 1997.
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Overall, two inferences  can be drawn from the disequilibrium  model evidence
presented  here. First, a crippling credit crunch,  rather than the typical weak demand for
bank credits  attributable  to exceptionally  higher interest  rates, appears  to have provided a
more important source behind a substantial  decline in bank loans after the onset of the
financial  crisis in December  1997. It seems most likely that the massive credit squeeze
created  by the commercial  banks during  the crisis  period was essentially  associated  with a
pervasive structural shift in bank behavior that occurred probably due to deteriorating
credit-market conditions such as  substantial illiquidity, a  wave of  major corporate
bankruptcies,  and those banks' desperate  needs  to rebuild  the BIS capital/asset  ratios, etc.
Furthermore, such a structural  change was consequently  responsible  for posing a critical
impediment to  the  ordinary functioning of  the  credit generating mechanism in  the
banking  sector. Second,  the episode  of the credit crunch  occurred  as a result of the crisis
sheds light on the independent  role of the credit  channel  in providing  an additional  source
of amplifying the economic decline.  Therefore it allows us to better understand the
serious  contractions  of real economic  activities  after the crisis. Namely,  the credit  crunch
would have a sufficiently-strong,  real effect beyond what would be predicted  merely by
the higher interest  rate, by causing binding constraints  on firms' (the small and medium-
sized firms most likely to be constrained)  availability  of credit to finance both short-term
working  capital  and investment  spending.
27IV.  Conclusions
This paper finds convincing  evidence of the practical importance  of the credit
channel (more specifically, the bank lending channel) in the monetary transmission
mechanism,  particularly following  the financial crisis. A number of major conclusions
can be drawn  from the empirical  results presented  in this paper.
First, as shown in the so-called "narrative" approach to identifying if the bank
lending channel  is operating (i.e., if the loan supply  rather than loan demand effects are
identified  as being important),  bank lending was found to play a significant  independent
role in amplifying  the real effects  of tightened  monetary  policy, which was implemented
in response  to the crisis (December  1997  episode). Bank lending channel  reinforced  the
dampening  effect of tightened  monetary  policy on real economic  activity that would be
expected had the policy been transmitted sorely through the interest rate channel.  It
seems most likely that the transmission mechanism from the financial distress in the
banking industry due to the crisis to a decline in the real economic  activity presumably
have worked  largely through  a reduction  in bank credit  to small and medium-sized  firms.
Second, when disaggregated  bank balance sheet data were used to test for the
existence  of the loan supply  effects  over the 1990s,  there was a much greater dampening
effect on both lending volume  and the securities  holding of small bank group than those
of the large bank group after a tightened  monetary  policy (i.e.,  a positive innovation  in the
call rate).  These results would be largely consistent  with the testable prediction of the
bank lending  channel  that the sensitivity  of both lending  volume and securities  holding  to
monetary tightening  should be more pronounced  for small banks typically  facing  higher
costs in attracting non-deposit  sources of external finance and thereby tighter liquidity
constraints,  just  as for their non-financial counterparts (i.e., small and medium-sized
firms).  Notably, the lending volume for each bank group was found to drop more
substantially  in response  to the crisis shock used as an alternative  measure of the severe
monetary contraction. This evidence could conceivably  suggest the role for the credit
crunch  that would  have occurred  in the wake of the crisis,  although  some  definitive  test is
needed to identify  more precisely  whether such a larger decline in lending for each bank
group in response to the crisis shock is attributable to the diminished loan supply or
demand.
Third, empirical  investigation  of the credit crunch  using a disequilibrium  model  of
loan market specifying  separate  loan demand and supply function revealed an evidence
that in the aftermath of the crisis in December 1997, there has occurred a substantial
excess demand for bank loans caused by a sharp loan supply decline (i.e., by the credit
crunch).  It is noteworthy that the credit crunch during the crisis was associated  with a
pervasive  structural  shift in bank behavior  nationwide  that led to a critical impediment  to
the ordinary  functioning  of the credit generating  mechanism  in the banking sector (i.e., a
systemic  crisis).  While the exact source of the structural shift is difficult to identify,  it
appears most likely that such a structural shift stemmed from the fragile credit market
conditions  which was under way even  before the crisis unfolded.  The adverse  conditions
would invoive an exposure of the banking sector to huge non-performing  loans driven
predominantly  by a wave of major corporate  bankruptcies  and the consequent  desperate
28needs to  rebuild the BIS capital/asset ratios.  What is more, the pattern of the  excess
demand for loans seems reasonably consistent with the survey measure to the extent of
the credit market tightness faced by the small and medium-sized firms.  It was found
during the  crisis  period  after  December  1997 that  the  ratio  of  the  respondents  who
answered greater difficulties in getting access to credits almost tripled compared to other
normal times.
Finally,  it  is  worthwhile  to  consider  several  policy  prescriptions  for  the
distributional consequences that would arise if there exists a distinctive lending channel
of the monetary  policy  transmission  or  a  systematic crisis  such  as  the  credit  crunch
occurs.  First, as we have argued, it is for the most part the bank-dependent small firms
that have to bear a disproportionate share of the real cost of monetary tightening or the
credit crunch.  What may be needed to address such a distributional disadvantage is to
provide a cushion  against the credit  crunch or  monetary policy  contractions either by
facilitating steady small business finance using trade credits, or by fostering relationship
lending and larger funds of credit guarantees."  Second, the supervision of banks should
be  strengthened  to  prevent  such  a  systemic  crisis  as  the  credit  crunch  that  might
substantially reduce the supply of credits to the small businesses.  In this case, however,
bank regulatory policy (on the recapitalization, for example) should not be imposed too
strictly during the crisis in particular, in light of its potential adverse effects on banks'
small business lending.  It is widely recognized that strictly-enforced BIS capital/asset
ratios after the IMF  bail-out actually  resulted in  a substantial  decline in banks'  small
business lending by making their lending behaviors excessively cautious.
In addition, from the standpoint of monetary policy management, if the lending
channel is quantitatively important, monetary policy-induced change in bank loans can
have  significant effects  on business investment  and aggregate spending  even if open-
market  interest  rates  do not  move by  much.  Consistent  with  this,  bank  loans  have
actually shown a close link to those real variables in Korea.  In this respect, it seem clear
that bank loans should be included as one of key information variables that the central
bank need to closely monitor when formulating policy.
21  See Berger and Udell (1998).
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